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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
Appellee-Defendant Union Pacific Railroad ("the Railroad") concurs with Appellant-
Plaintiff Eugene Francisconi's statement of the issues, with the exception of the first issue 
presented, which is properly stated as follows: 
1. Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Francisconi's motion to strike 
the Railroad's amended memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment for 
alleged violation of the scheduling order. 
Standard of Review: Given the district court's "broad discretion" in handling 
scheduling matters, appellate review is for abuse of discretion - not, as Mr. Francisconi 
states, for correction of error. A. K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen 
Construction, 1999 UT App 87, If 36, 977 P.2d 518. 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Mr. Francisconi's claims are governed by the common law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
Mr. Francisconi lost his job at the Railroad when auditors discovered his systematic 
abuse of the Railroad's expense reimbursement policy - abuses which included cutting and 
splicing receipts and obtaining reimbursement for purchasing items such as RV batteries and 
waterbed supplies for family members. In an effort to save his job when confronted with the 
abuse, Mr. Francisconi drafted and signed a lengthy handwritten statement admitting his 
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misconduct. Nevertheless, the Railroad determined that Mr. Francisconi's dishonesty 
merited termination. 
Mr. Francisconi claims his termination violated four implied employment contracts. 
No reasonable jury could come to such a conclusion, however. At all times, Mr. Francisconi 
was an at-will employee, a fact affirmed inter alia by an express agreement with the 
Railroad. Mr. Francisconi has also brought claims for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, defamation, and fraud arising out of the termination. None of these claims has any 
merit. The district court did not err in dismissing these claims on summary judgment. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below, 
The Railroad adopts Mr. Francisconi's statement of the Course of Proceedings Below. 
C. Statement of Facts, 
Eugene Francisconi applied for work and was hired by Union Pacific Railroad 
Company in 1970. (Record on Appeal ("R.") 1023.) Contained within his Application for 
Employment is a statement of the Terms and Conditions of Employment. (R. 1042-49.) By 
signing these terms and conditions, Mr. Francisconi specifically agreed that his employment 
with the Railroad was indefinite, that it would continue only so long as mutually agreeable 
to both parties, and that it could be terminated by either party at any time, with or without 
cause. Id. Mr. Francisconi also specifically agreed in writing that these terms and conditions 
could not be waived or modified except by written agreement. (R. 1049, 1470-86.) 
While employed by the Railroad, Mr. Francisconi worked in a variety of positions. 
From 1976 through 1996, Mr. Francisconi worked in management positions and was not 
covered by the terms of any collective bargaining agreement. (R. 1024.) As of 1996, 
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Mr. Francisconi was employed as a Safety Manager based in Salt Lake City. His job duties 
required extensive travel. (R. 1024.) 
During January, 1996, the Railroad conducted an audit of the Personal Expense 
Reports of Mr. Francisconi as part of an audit of the top 200 Personal Expense Accounts in 
the company. (R. 1024.) The original audit was conducted by John A. Ivester, a Corporate 
Auditor for Union Pacific Coiporation, the parent company of Appellee-Defendant Union 
Pacific Railroad Company. (R. 1024, 1058-59, 1470-75.) 
As he reviewed Mr. Francisconi's Personal Expense Reports, Mr. Ivester noticed that 
portions of certain receipts were missing. Upon close examination of the original receipts 
submitted by Mr. Francisconi, Mr. Ivester discovered that receipts had been cut and then 
taped back together. As a result of this discovery, Mr. Ivester conducted a more detailed 
audit, examining expense reports submitted by Mr. Francisconi for the period January 1, 
1994 through March 31,1996. (R. 1024,1059.) His audit disclosed that Mr. Francisconi had 
received reimbursement for many "in lieu o f expenses. (R. 1024.) The company's "in lieu 
o f policy provides: 
"In lieu o f living expenses will be reimbursed by the company where 
the expense represents a reasonable and proper substitution for another 
expense which the employee normally would have incurred. 
The "in lieu o f expense must represent amounts actually expended and 
a description of the "in lieu o f expense must be documented in the expense 
statement with an original receipt. The purchase of a gift for the hostess in 
appreciation of a gratuitous meal served to an employee while traveling on 
company business, at the home of a fellow employee or business associate, 
would represent an example of an appropriate "in lieu o f expense. The 
payment of cash for "in lieu o f expenses must be documented by canceled 
check or receipt. (R. 1024.) 
During the 27-month period covered by the audit, Mr. Francisconi received 
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reimbursement on 32 occasions for "in lieu o f lodging expenses. Twenty-seven of the "in 
lieu o f lodging gifts involved trips to Pocatello, Idaho where Mr. Francisconi's father 
resided. Most trips to Pocatello involved a weekend stay during which time Mr. Francisconi 
claimed meals and "in lieu o f lodging compensation. In only one instance did 
Mr. Francisconi identify the recipients of the gifts and provide descriptions of the purchases 
on his Personal Expense Reports. Most purchases were documented only by duplicate credit 
card receipts rather than original itemized store receipts. Upon close examination of the 
receipts, Mr. Ivester discovered that certain receipts had been altered. Original store receipts 
had been meticulously cut and re-taped to remove the itemized descriptions of merchandise 
purchased. (R. 1059.) 
Many purchases claimed by Mr. Francisconi as "in lieu o f expenses were charged 
to the Railroad's coiporate American Express card. Mr. Ivester compared the Railroad's 
itemized American Express bills to the receipts submitted by Mr. Francisconi to identify the 
merchandise purchased. In addition, Mr. Ivester contacted certain stores directly and 
obtained itemized details of merchandise purchased by Mr. Francisconi and claimed as "in 
lieu o f expenses. At least six store receipts submitted by Mr. Francisconi had been altered 
to conceal the nature of the merchandise purchased. Itemized descriptions were cut out and 
the receipts re-created so that only the sales tax and total amount of the purchase was shown. 
(R. 1059-60.) 
Mr. Francisconi was instructed by his supervisor, Gary Johnson, to report to Omaha 
for a meeting on April 26,1996. Prior to the meeting, Mr. Francisconi spoke with four other 
Railroad employees who had undergone expense account audits. He also spoke with another 
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employee who had not personally been through an audit, but who had talked to a number of 
individuals who had. Mr. Francisconi reviewed his own Personal Expense Reports back 
through 1995 and 1996. He also reviewed his personal calendar to verify where he was and 
that his expense accounts covered what he had in his planner. (R. 1025-26.) 
At the meeting on April 26,1996, Mr. Francisconi was interviewed primarily by Mike 
Bernard (Audit Manager) and Gary T. Lottmann (Director of Police Operations for the 
Railroad). Neil Vargason (Chief Mechanical Officer), Jim Hale (Assistant Controller -
Auditing), Janice Arthur (Senior Auditor), and Gary D. Johnson (Director - Safety, Health, 
and Environmental Monitoring), also attended the interview. (R. 1026.) Janice Arthur took 
detailed notes of the interview and then prepared a written summary of the responses given 
by Mr. Francisconi. (R. 1026, 1106-14, 1488-1500.) 
Mr. Francisconi claimed that the "in lieu o f lodging gifts purchased in Pocatello were 
provided to his father. Mr. Francisconi claimed that the dollar value of those gifts did not 
exceed the amount that a hotel room would have cost. Mr. Francisconi admitted that he had 
altered receipts because, in his opinion, specific information regarding the nature of the gifts 
was personal. (R. 1026, 1106-07, 1488-1500.) Mr. Francisconi admitted that his wife 
traveled with him on business trips and that some of the items were purchased for her at his 
father's request. Mr. Francisconi admitted that he knew these purchases were for his wife 
and were improper. Mr. Francisconi admitted that some merchandise claimed as an "in lieu 
o f gift for his father was actually given to his sister. (R. 1026,1107-13,1382,1488-1500.) 
Items purchased by Mr. Francisconi and claimed as "in lieu o f lodging gifts in 
Pocatello included the following: 
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1. On April 30,1995, Mr. Francisconi purchased items at ShopKo in the amount 
of $86.64, which he then claimed as an "in lieu o f gift for his father. The merchandise 
included cleaning supplies, candy, make-up, toilet paper and juice. (R. 1027, 1382.) 
2. On June 3,1995, Mr. Francisconi purchased merchandise at Fred Meyer in the 
amount of $88.62 which he claimed as an "in lieu o f gift for his father. American Express 
statements disclosed that the merchandise included an RV battery, 3 plastic pots, a battery-
post washer, light bulbs, battery cleaner, and a white ruffle square. Id. 
3. On August 28,1995, Mr. Francisconi purchased merchandise from Fred Meyer 
in the amount of $93.18 and then claimed this purchase as an "in lieu o f lodging gift for his 
father. The items purchased included saline solution, razors, pantyhose, women's toiletries, 
deodorant, and a second RV battery. Id. 
4. On January 26, 1996, Mr. Francisconi purchased merchandise from ShopKo 
in the amount of $41.55. Mr. Francisconi claimed this purchase as an "in lieu o f lodging 
gift to his father. The merchandise included Werthers (candy), maxi pads, a nylon cassette 
case, Aspen cologne, a watch battery, Ex-Lax, Miraflow cleaner, and waterbed supplies. 
Mr. Francisconi admitted that he had a waterbed but that his father did not. Id. 
5. On February 24,1996, Mr. Francisconi purchased merchandise at Bon Marche 
in Pocatello and claimed the expense as an "in lieu o f lodging expense. The itemized 
description was meticulously cut out and taped together to conceal the detail of the 
merchandise purchased. Corporate American Express statements revealed that woven tops, 
socks, and hair accessories were purchased. (R. 1027, 1063-64, 1382.) 
During the April 26 interview, Mr. Francisconi admitted that many of his purchases 
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had not been appropriate and that he knew it was wrong to request reimbursement for these 
items. He admitted that he altered the receipts in order to conceal the items purchased. 
® 1114, 1488-1500.) During the interview, Mr. Francisconi also prepared a handwritten 
statement admitting his misconduct. In pertinent part the statement reads as follows: 
I, Gene Francisconi, on April 26, 1996, at 12:30 p.m., freely and 
voluntarily admit to making in lieu of expense purchases not in accordance 
to the intent of the policy. I didn't include the itemized receipts for these 
purchases and I altered receipts to remove the itemized items listed on the 
receipts. I was aware that items purchased were being given to my wife, 
my sister and my son and other people that my Dad chose to give them to. 
I also admit to including personal time with company time while I was in 
Pocatello on weekends and being reimbursed by the company for the time 
spent there for expenses. I was wrong in what I have done and am 
extremely sorry for misusing the expense account system. (R. 1027-28, 
1116.) 
At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Francisconi was removed from service 
pending further review. (R. 1028.) The Corporate Audit Staff prepared a summary of its 
findings. (R. 1119, 1121-22, 1470-75) 
Later, Mr. Vargason, Mr. Johnson and the auditors met with Arthur Shoener, 
Executive Vice President of Operations, to review the information obtained during the audit, 
including the interview. After reviewing the information, Mr. Shoener considered 
Mr. Francisconi's conduct to be "falsification." Mr. Vargason and the other members of the 
team recommended to Mr. Shoener that Mr. Francisconi be terminated. (R. 1028,1125-27.) 
The Railroad classified expense account irregularities ("audit exceptions") into three 
categories. Category 1 exceptions involved honest mistakes. Category 2 exceptions 
involved sloppiness, bad judgment, etc., but not a pattern of wilful disregard for the expense 
policy or intent to deceive. Category 3 exceptions involved a pattern of wilful disregard for 
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the expense policy or an intent to deceive. Five individuals, including Mr. Francisconi, were 
classified as Category 3 exceptions. All individuals with Category 3 exceptions were either 
terminated or resigned. (R. 1572) 
Mr. Francisconi was classified as a Category 3 exception by the audit team because 
he had carefully altered receipts to conceal the true nature of the items purchased. This 
falsification of documents demonstrated that Mr. Francisconi knew that the claimed expenses 
were inappropriate and that he intended to deceive the company. In addition, 
Mr. Francisconi demonstrated a pattern of wilful disregard for the expense policy by the 
large number of "in lieu o f lodging expenses claimed (32 separate occasions). (R. 1572.) 
Tom Campbell, Assistant Vice President for Support Sendees, telephoned 
Mr. Francisconi on May 1,1996 and informed Mr. Francisconi that he could either resign or 
be temiinated. Mr. Campbell also informed Mr. Francisconi that the company was sending 
to him a proposed Separation Agreement for his review and consideration. Mr. Campbell 
suggested that Mr. Francisconi obtain advice from counsel before signing the agreement. 
Mr. Francisconi received the proposed Separation Agreement on May 2, 1996. As part of 
the proposed agreement, Mr. Francisconi would be allowed to resign his employment and 
to repay certain personal expenses that had been disallowed. Mr. Francisconi was given until 
May 17, 1996 to review and consider the proposed Separation Agreement. (R. 1028.) 
On May 17,1996, Mr. Francisconi rejected the proposed Separation Agreement. The 
Railroad then began to process the paperwork terminating his employment effective April 27, 
1996. Because Mr. Francisconi was no longer employed by the Railroad, his group medical 
insurance coverage lapsed effective April 30, 1996. On June 7, 1996, Mr. Francisconi was 
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notified of his right to elect COBRA continuation coverage. On June 21, 1996, Sharlene 
Francisconi elected COBRA coverage. Mr. Francisconi did not elect COBRA coverage. 
(R.28, 1028-29, 1135, 1137-40, 1383.) 
The Railroad began implementation of a new Employee Discipline Policy called 
UPGRADE on July 1, 1994. By its terms and the history of its implementation, the 
UPGRADE policy relates exclusively to discipline of non-management employees covered 
by a collective bargaining agreement between the Railroad and a labor union. The policy has 
never been applied to management employees. (R. 1029,1142-63,1383.) Mr. Francisconi 
is not aware of any management employee given an UPGRADE hearing. (R. 1029, 1383, 
1405.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Mr. Francisconi's breach of contract claim was properly dismissed because as 
a matter of law he failed to meet his burden of establishing the existence of an implied 
contract altering his at-will employment status. Mr. Francisconi's argument that the "in lieu 
o f policy created an implied contract altering his at-will status fails, inasmuch as the policy 
had nothing to do with the term of his employment. In any event, under Mr. Francisconi's 
own formulation of the alleged contract, abuse of the policy would constitute a proper ground 
for dismissal. The record is abundantly clear that Mr. Francisconi flagrantly abused the "in 
lieu o f policy. 
The contention that the UPGRADE policy altered Mr. Francisconi's at-will status 
borders on the frivolous. By its express terms, structure, and history, the UPGRADE policy 
applies solely to union employees, not to nonunion managers like Mr. Francisconi. Given 
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this, Mr. Francisconi's further allegation that the Railroad offered him UPGRADE (i.e., 
union) disciplinary procedures - thus creating an implied contract - in the very process of 
terminating his employment for dishonesty is objectively unreasonable. The alleged contract 
would also lack consideration. 
Finally, there is no merit to the argument that an implied contract was created when 
the Railroad allegedly promised Mr. Francisconi that he could keep his job in exchange for 
signing a confession. Upon closer examination, even the disputed statement that forms the 
basis of the alleged contract is not truly an offer, but rather an expression that the "first thing" 
Mr. Francisconi could do to have any chance of saving his job was to come clean and admit 
his misconduct. Confession was a necessary step to saving his job, but ultimately it was not 
sufficient. Such a contract would also contradict an express agreement that Mr. 
Francisconi's employment at the Railroad would be at-will, and that any change to that status 
would also be in writing. It also lacks consideration. Moreover, the argument is 
disingenuous since Mr. Francisconi now claims the confession was false and since the theory 
of his case is that he was terminated for personal reasons which the alleged contract would 
not preclude. 
2. Mr. Francisconi fails to establish a prima facie claim for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress because none of the Railroad's alleged conduct could possibly be 
described as outrageous and intolerable - "extraordinarily vile" or "atrocious" - as required 
by the applicable standard. The suggestion that the Railroad improperly denied or delayed 
COBRA coverage is false. The Railroad had a legal right not to offer COBRA coverage 
under the "gross misconduct" exception, but offered it anyway. 
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3. Mr. Francisconi's claim for defamation was properly dismissed because there 
is no evidence the Railroad made any non-privileged communication that could reasonably 
be construed as defamatoiy. Further, the alleged defamatory statements were true and thus 
absolutely privileged. 
4. Lastly, Mr. Francisconi' s fraud claim is not supported by clear and convincing 
evidence and thus fails as a matter of law. Even assuming the alleged statement was made, 
it was not false and, in any event, did not concern a presently existing material fact. The 
elements of a viable fraud claim are therefore lacking. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Standard on Summary Judgment 
Mr. Francisconi's claims were dismissed on summary judgment pursuant to the 
familiar standard in Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Throughout his 
opening brief, Mr. Francisconi contends that each of his claims turns on disputed facts and 
therefore that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. However, not every 
factual disagreement makes summary judgment inappropriate. The controlling question is 
whether a "genuine issue" of "material fact" exists. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A genuine issue 
of fact exists where, on the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ" 
on any material issue. Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). Where a 
reasonable jury could come to only one conclusion, the factual dispute is not genuine or 
material and summary judgment is still appropriate. "[S]ummary judgment [is not 
precluded] simply [because] some fact remains in dispute but only when a material fact is 
genuinely controverted." Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390,1391 (Utah 1980) 
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(emphasis added). 
A "material" fact is one that can affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 
substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (discussing 
Federal Rule 56(c)). "[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view 
the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden." Id. at 254. 
Thus, as further explained below, the substantive hurdle that must be overcome to prove a 
claim factors into the determination of whether a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. 
More particularly, summary judgment is routinely granted in wrongful termination 
cases alleging the existence of an implied contract. In such cases, "the court retains the 
power to decide whether, as a matter of law, a reasonable jury could find that an implied 
contract exists." Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303,306 (Utah 1992). If not, 
"summary judgment is appropriate." Id. (citations omitted). That is precisely the case here. 
II. Summary Judgment Was Properly Granted on Mr. Francisconi's Claim for 
"Breach of Employment Contract." 
Utah law presumes that all employment is at-will. Mr. Francisconi's case largely 
turns on whether he can rebut this presumption by marshaling sufficient evidence to prove 
the existence of an implied contract that altered his at-will status. Mr. Francisconi has failed 
to meet that burden. Given the existence of "written policies and disclaimers" that directly 
undennine his assertions, and especially in light of the nature of the instant dispute, none of 
Mr. Francisconi's evidence is "strong enough to overcome the presumption of at-will 
employment" such that a reasonable jury could find an implied contract limiting the 
Railroad's right to terminate. Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 P.2d 331,334 (Utah 1992). 
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Mr. Francisconi began his employment with the Railroad by expressly agreeing in writing 
that he would be an at-will employee. That status never changed, least of all while the 
Railroad was in the very process of terminating him for gross dishonesty. The arguments to 
the contrary are so utterly implausible that no reasonable jury could accept them. 
A. Utah Law Presumes That Mr. Francisconi Was an At-Will Employee 
Who Could Be Terminated at Any Time and for Any Reason. 
Under well-established Utah law, employment is presumed to be terminable at-will. 
See, e.g., Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 1992). "[A]n 
employee hired for an indefinite period is presumed to be an employee at will who can be 
terminated for any reason whatsoever so long as the termination does not violate a state or 
federal [anti-discrimination] statute." Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d997,1000 
(Utah 1991). Excepting unlawful discrimination and terminations in violation of public 
policy (neither at issue here1), an employer can "terminate an [at-will] employee for no 
cause, good cause, or even cause morally wrong without fear of liability." Rose v. Allied 
Development Co., 719 P.2d 83, 84-85 (Utah 1986) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
]Mr. Francisconi originally pled a claim for termination in violation of public policy, 
but abandoned it during the briefing on summary judgment. (R. 29, 1239-48.) 
Mr. Francisconi has not attempted to revive such a claim on appeal. 
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B. Mr. Francisconi Expressly Agreed in Writing to Be an At-will Employee 
When He Began Work For The Railroad. 
Mr. Francisconi's at-will employment status was more than a mere unspoken 
presumption. Mr. Francisconi expressly agreed, in writing, to be an at-will employee and 
further agreed that no change in this status could occur except by an express writing on his 
employment contract. Mr. Francisconi signed a document entitled Terms and Conditions of 
Employment which included the following provision: "Term of employment: It is 
understood that the term of my employment is indefinite; that it will continue only so long 
as mutually agreeable to both parties, and that it may be terminated by either party at any 
time, with or without cause." (R. 1047.) Mr. Francisconi acknowledged that he 
"underst[oo]nd and agree[d] that no waiver or modification of any of the foregoing 
conditions shall be valid or of any effect unless the same be endorsed hereon in writing in 
the space labeled 'Special Conditions'." (R. 1049.) No special conditions are noted. 
In short, Mr. Francisconi specifically contracted to be an at-will employee whose 
status could not be altered except by written agreement. No such written agreement exists. 
C. Mr. Francisconi Bears the Burden of Proving the Existence of a Valid 
Employment Contract Altering His At-Will Status. 
Both in the trial court and on appeal, Mr. Francisconi has relied solely on an implied 
contract theory. It is well established that "[t]he burden of proving the existence of a contract 
is on the party seeking enforcement of it." Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384,1386 (Utah 
1977). Thus, Mr. Francisconi bears the burden of proving (1) that an implied contract existed 
between him and the Railroad, (2) that the contract altered his at-will status, and (3) that the 
Railroad breached the contract in terminating his employment. 
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In Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme 
Court explained the special burden an employee faces in proving the existence of an implied 
contract altering his or her at-will status: 
It is clear that the employee has the burden of establishing the existence of an 
implied-in-fact contract provision, that is, the employee must show that 
although there was no express contract provision to this effect, the parties 
nevertheless agreed that the employment would not be at-will. If the parties 
actually intended such an agreement and the agreement is of such a nature 
that it is possible to operate as a contract term, a court will give effect to the 
parties' intention by enforcing the agreement as an implied-in-fact contract 
provision. The existence of such an agreement is a question of fact which 
turns on the objective manifestations of the parties' intent. As a question of 
fact, the intent of the parties is primarily a jury question. However, if the 
evidence presented is such that no reasonable jury could conclude that the 
parties agreed to limit the employer's right to terminate the employee, it is 
appropriate for a court to decide the issue as a matter of law. 
Id. at 1001 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added). In other words, for an implied-in-fact 
employment contract to exist, the following must occur: 
The employer must communicate the intent to offer employment other than at 
will, the communication must be sufficiently definite to act as a contract 
provision, and the communicated intent must be such that the employee may 
reasonably believe that the employment offered is other than at-will. 
Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 P.2d 331, 334 (Utah 1992). 
The terms of an employee manual can be part of an implied-in-fact employment 
contract, but the Utah Supreme Court has held that "if an employee manual is to be 
considered part of an employment contract, the terms should be considered terms of a 
unilateral contract." Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1001. Unilateral contract principles govern the 
formation of the contract: 
Under a unilateral contract analysis, an employer's promise of employment 
under certain terms and for an indefinite period constitutes both the terms of 
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the employment contract and the employer's consideration for the employment 
contract. The employee's performance of service pursuant to the employer's 
offer constitutes both the employee's acceptance of the offer and the 
employee's consideration for the contract. Therefore, for an implied-in-fact 
contract term to exist, it must meet the requirements for an offer of a unilateral 
contract. There must be a manifestation of the employer's intent that is 
communicated to the employee and sufficiently definite to operate as a 
contract provision. Furthermore, the manifestation of the employer's intent 
must he of such a nature that the employee can reasonably believe that the 
employer is making an offer of employment other than employment at will. 
Id. at 1001-02 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, "[a]n employee handbook may create binding [contractual] terms only if 
those terms are consistent with the meaning of the contract as a whole." Hodgson, 844 P.2d 
at 335. As with all implied contracts, the alleged "agreement [must be] of such a nature that 
it is possible to operate as a contract term." Johnson, % 18 P.2d at 1001. Further, a plaintiff s 
mere "subjective belief that a contract exists does "not meet the unilateral contract standard 
of reasonable, objective, belief required under Utah law. Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah 
Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah App. 1994); Hodgson, 844 P.2d at 335. Finally, 
"the proper construction of contractual terms in the first instance raises an issue of law to be 
decided by a court, unless contract terms are ambiguous and raise factual issues." Brehany 
v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah 1991). As noted, Utah courts often dispose of 
implied contract claims on summary judgment. 
D. Mr. Francisconi's Express Contract to be an At-Will Employee Was Not 
Altered Or Modified by an Implied Contract. 
Mr. Francisconi has never argued that he and the Railroad expressly contracted to 
modify the contract making him an at-will employee. Mr. Francisconi relies exclusively on 
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implied contract principles to establish his claim. However, he fails to meet his burden of 
proving the existence of an implied-in-fact contract. 
1. The "In Lieu Of' Policy Did Not Create an Implied Contract. 
Mr. Francisconi contends that the Railroad's "in lieu o f policy created an implied 
contract that he would not be terminated for properly using the policy. Brf. App. at 34; 
R. 29. This argument is a play on words. The Railroad's "in lieu o f policy is addressed 
solely to expense reimbursements, not to the term of Mr. Francisconi's employment or the 
reasons for which he could be terminated. The most the "in lieu o f policy created was a 
contract requiring the Railroad to reimburse Mr. Francisconi for authorized expenses. See 
Cook v. Zions First National Bank, 919 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah App. 1996) (sick leave policy 
created contract allowing employee to accrue sick leave but was irrelevant to at-will status). 
But unlike the situation in Cook, Mr. Francisconi has never claimed the Railroad failed to 
reimburse him for authorized "in lieu o f expenses. The "in lieu o f policy cannot 
reasonably be construed as an offer to alter Mr. Francisconi's at-will employment status. 
Indeed, as this Court has previously held, such a policy is not "even relevant" to the question 
of Mr. Francisconi's at-will employment status. Id. The "in lieu o f policy says absolutely 
nothing that would allow Mr. Francisconi to "reasonably believe that [the Railroad was] 
making an offer of employment other than employment at will." Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1002. 
At any rate, the argument fails on its own terms. Mr. Francisconi's own formulation 
of the alleged contract would permit termination for misuse of the "in lieu o f policy. It 
cannot seriously be denied that Mr. Francisconi violated the letter or at least the spirit of the 
policy. He admitted as much in a signed, hand-written statement. His self-serving attempt 
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to disavow his own confession is without merit.2 See Brf. App. at 9-10, 36. 
Even setting aside the confession, Mr. Francisconi clearly violated the "in lieu o f 
policy with at least one of his many curious purchases. It borders on the frivolous to argue 
that two RV batteries, pantyhose, and waterbed supplies, to name just a few, were "a 
reasonable and proper substitution for another expense which the employee normally would 
have incurred [in the course of company business]." (R. 1059.) As for hostess gifts, when, 
was the last time anyone ever gave Ex-Lax, saline solution, a battery post washer, or maxi 
pads as a gift for a "hostess in appreciation of a gratuitous meal served to an employee"?. 
And it is wholly untenable to suggest that the requirement to submit an "original receipt" 
could possibly be satisfied by the cut and spliced receipts Mr. Francisconi in fact submitted. 
That Mr. Francisconi made these expenditures is not in dispute, nor is the text of the 
"in lieu o f policy. As a matter of law, Mr. Francisconi violated the "in lieu of policy" and 
therefore the termination was proper. 
Plaintiffs reliance on the Idaho Supreme Court's decision mMetcalfv. Intermountain 
2Mr. Francisconi utterly fails to establish that his admission was involuntary. As the 
Utah Supreme Court has held in the criminal context, the issued/or the court to decide under 
a "totality of the circumstances" analysis is not merely whether there was impermissible 
coercion, but also "whether the coercive tactics... overcame [the person's] free will, causing 
him to confess." State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1993). Here, viewing the totality 
of the alleged circumstances, there was neither impermissible coercion nor an overcoming 
of Mr. Francisconi's free will. Indeed, Mr. Francisconi's argument is essentially that he 
made a calculated decision to give a false confession to save his job. The evidence confirms 
that his will was very much intact. Cf. State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037,1040 n.3 (Utah App. 
1993) (being arrested by four police officers, handcuffed, and en route to jail insufficient to 
establish improper coercion). Moreover, Mr. Francisconi has never set forth exactly which 
parts, if any, of his allegedly involuntary confession are inaccurate, and how so. He simply 
asserts its was involuntary and leaves it at that. That is not enough. 
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Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744 (Idaho 1989), is misplaced. See Brf. App. at 34-35, n. 6. In Metcalf 
the employee was terminated for her undisputedly proper use of an employer sick-leave 
policy; there was no suggestion that the employee had abused the policy in any way. The 
employer in essence denied her sick leave by punishing her for taking it. By contrast, 
Mr. Francisconi was not terminated because he used the "in lieu o f policy, but because he 
flagrantly misused it. That distinction is critical. Metcalf did not purport to limit in any way 
the right of an employer to terminate an at-will employee for abuse of a company policy. 
Moreover, Mr. Francisconi's reading of Metcalf is simply not the law in Utah. This 
Court in Robertson v. Utah Fuel Company, 889 P.2d 1382 (Utah App. 1995), directly 
rejected the very argument for which Mr. Francisconi invokes Metcalf In Robertson, this 
Court refused to interpret a company policy offering "rehabilitative assistance" for employee 
drug abusers as creating an implied contract not to terminate an employee who used it. Id. 
at 1386. The court reasoned that the policy could not reasonably be understood to alter the 
plaintiffs at-will status. Id. The same is true here. 
The rule established by Robertson is supported by sound public policy as well. 
Mr. Francisconi is essentially arguing that every company policy, regardless of subject 
matter, can alter an employee's at-will employment status. Under his view, each little 
company policy would create an implied contract not to erroneously terminate an employee 
for failing to comply with the policy. Such a rule would inevitably spawn endless lawsuits, 
as every employee terminated for noncompliance with a company policy would 
automatically have a claim for breach of an implied contract. Employers would lose the 
discretion to make business decisions about employee compliance with company policies. 
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In a company with numerous policies, such a rule would essentially create a good-cause 
standard for termination, utterly vitiating the at-will employment doctrine. The "in lieu o f 
policy cannot be the basis of a wrongful termination claim. 
2. The UPGRADE Policy Did Not Create an Implied Contract. 
Mr. Francisconi's argument that the UPGRADE policy was an implied-in-fact 
contract that altered his at-will status is spurious. By its express terms, structure, and history, 
the UPGRADE policy is totally inapplicable to managerial employees like Mr. Francisconi. 
Mr. Francisconi's argument rests entirely on a highly selective reading of two sentences in 
the policy and subjective beliefs about the policy's meaning which are objectively 
unreasonable. Yet the UPGRADE policy must "be read as a whole, in an attempt to 
harmonize and give effect to all of the contract provisions." Elm, Inc. v. M.T. Enterprises, 
Inc., 968 P.2d 861,863 (Utah App. 1998). And only objectively reasonable beliefs, not mere 
"subjective" beliefs, count under the applicable unilateral contract analysis. See Sorenson, 
873P.2datll47. 
As explained above, the UPGRADE Policy creates a disciplinary system for the 
Railroad's union employees, i.e., for new-managerial employees who are subjectto the terms 
of a collective bargaining agreement. The UPGRADE policy has never been applied to 
management employees like Mr. Francisconi. There is absolutely no evidence the Railroad 
ever intended the UPGRADE Policy to limit its ability to terminate at-will managers like 
Mr. Francisconi, and there is no evidence Mr. Francisconi ever worked at the Railroad under 
a reasonable expectation that he was entitled to UPGRADE procedures. In fact, the evidence 
is directly to the contrary. 
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First, the UPGRADE policy never purported to alter Mr. Francisconi's express 
agreement with the Railroad that he would be an at-will employee. There is nothing in the 
UPGRADE policy suggesting it alters the at-will status of management employees. 
Second, the language and structure of the UPGRADE policy demonstrate that any 
subjective expectation by Mr. Francisconi that the policy would apply to him was wholly 
unreasonable. It is obviously meant to apply only to union employees. The Policy contains 
numerous references to collective bargaining agreements and to interactions between 
management and the union representatives of the employees subject to the policy. For 
example, on page 1 of the Policy under the section captioned "Policy Guidelines," the very 
first guideline reads: "All collective bargaining agreements apply." (R. 1145.) In the same 
section it reads, "Employees must be allowed to discuss the terms of the discipline with 
union representation." Id. 
On page 3 of the Policy, the Manager is instructed to "[pjrepare the Notice of 
Investigation consistent with applicable Collective Bargaining Agreements and attach it to 
form 2." (R. 1147.) On page 4 it reads: "The Employee may talk with a union 
representative prior to selecting an option." (R. 1148.) On page 10, under the "Appeal 
Authorities" section, the following introductory statement appears: "UPGRADE provides 
a two step appeal process consistent with the provisions of existing collective bargaining 
agreements." (R. 1154, emphasis added.) On the same page, the Policy provides that "Labor 
Relations" has responsibility for handing step two appeals - "Labor Relations" being the 
company department responsible for interaction with labor unions. Id. Management 
employees are not represented by labor unions. 
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Mr. Francisconi's strained reading of the policy relies almost exclusively on two 
phrases in an introductory letter from the Railroad's CEO. The first states that the company 
would now "begin implementation" of the policy "across the entire railroad system." 
(R. 1143.) Read in context, the sentence simply means that, having been field tested in 
several select locations, the policy would now be used "across the entire railroad system." 
It had nothing to do with the union/non-union dichotomy. The second phrase states that the 
CEO is "optimistic the new UPGRADE Policy will achieve its goals and will be a benefit for 
all employees and the company." (R. 1143.) But that is nothing more than a CEO's 
expression of hope that the company and its employees will be better off under the new 
policy, as should be the case if the policy succeeds in making labor-management relations 
more harmonious. Mr. Francisconi cannot pluck isolated phrases out of their context and use 
them to reach an absurd result inconsistent with a commonsense reading of the entire policy. 
The language and entire structure of the UPGRADE Policy both presume and depend on a 
distinction between managerial employees, who administer the Policy, and union members, 
who are subject to it. Absent that distinction, the Policy makes no sense. 
The Policy's history supports this conclusion. The Policy has never been applied to 
managerial employees like Mr. Francisconi. (R. 1029,1383.) Mr. Francisconi is not aware 
of any management employee given an UPGRADE hearing. Id, Mr. Francisconi references 
only two individuals who subjectively believed they were covered by the Policy (one of 
whom is a union employee), Brf. App. at 39, but neither claimed to have actual knowledge 
in that regard and neither knew of any manager who had been disciplined under UPGRADE. 
(SeeR. 1387-88 (reviewing deposition testimony of Alan Hill and Robert Rupp).) Subjective 
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opinions cannot overturn the plain meaning of the Policy. See Robertson, 889 P.2d at 1388 
(disciplinary procedures found not to apply despite subjective beliefs to the contrary; 
"opinion testimony does not rebut the plain language of the [policy] ...."). 
In Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., this Court addressed a claim that a 
company manual, together with other company statements, created an implied contract 
altering the plaintiffs at-will status. However, as here, the manual was "written in terms 
suggesting that it applied to union employees." 873 P.2d at 1148. The Court held that the 
"conflicting evidence" about the company's statements "suggests anything but a clear 
manifestation of the employer's intent to alter the at-will relationship with respect to salaried 
employees upon which [the plaintiff] could reasonably rely." Id. 
So too here. Implied-in-fact employment contracts depend upon a clear and objective 
"manifestation of the employer's intent" that engenders certain reasonable expectations in 
the employee. See Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1001-02. Nothing in the UPGRADE Policy itself 
— and especially nothing in the manner it was actually administered over a period of years 
— could have given Mr. Francisconi a "reasonable] belie[f] that the [Railroad] [was] 
making an offer of employment other than employment at will." Id. Mr. Francisconi's 
"subjective belief to the contrary did not create an implied employment contract. 
3. Mr. Francisconi's Bald Assertion that the Railroad Promised 
UPGRADE Hearings Is Utterly Implausible: No Reasonable Jury 
Could Find an Implied Contract Under the Circumstances. 
The same holds for the Mr. Francisconi's bald assertion that in the very process of 
terminating him for his gross abuse of the "in lieu o f policy the Railroad offered him the 
choice of invoking the UPGRADE Policy's disciplinary procedures for union employees. 
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Brf App. at 41. Everyone else present flatly denies that any such statement was ever made 
- Mr. Francisconi's self-serving assertion is all that supports this allegation. (R. 1386-87.) 
Regardless, Mr. Francisconi's alleged belief that such a statement altered his at-will status 
is objectively unreasonable. Given his employment agreement with the Railroad, 
Mr. Francisconi knew or should have known that the Railroad would never offer to change 
his at-will employment status merely through an oral statement when they had expressly 
agreed that any such change would occur only through a written modification. 
Moreover, no manager could have an objectively reasonable belief that the 
disciplinary procedures outlined in the UPGRADE Policy would be applied to nonunion 
employees. The plain language and obvious structure of the Policy are clearly to the 
contrary. Mr. Francisconi had never known a manager to be disciplined using UPGRADE 
procedures; indeed, in the entire histoiy of the Policy it had never been applied to a single 
manager. No reasonable jury could find that Mr. Francisconi had an objectively reasonable 
belief that the Railroad offered what was both absurd and unprecedented.3 Summary 
judgment was entirely proper on this claim. 
4. Under the Circumstances, No Reasonable Jury Could Find that an 
Implied Contract Arose from the Alleged Promise that Mr. Francisconi 
Could Keep His Job If He Signed an Admission of Wrongdoing. 
Mr. Francisconi claims that at the April 26 meeting Gary Lottman "offered to allow 
Mr. Francisconi to keep his job in exchange for writing and signing a statement that 
3Further, the alleged implied contract was not supported by any consideration or 
affirmative action on Mr. Francisconi's part to accept the alleged offer. There is no evidence 
he ever actually requested UPGRADE or attempted to obtain information about his alleged 
rights thereunder. 
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Mr. Lottman would dictate to Mr. Francisconi." Brf. App. at 40. The Railroad allegedly 
violated this contract by terminating him precisely for violating the "in lieu oF policy. 
However, even Mr. Francisconi's own contested evidence does not support this conclusion. 
When confronted at the meeting with his dishonesty, Mr. Francisconi allegedly asked 
what he needed to do to keep his job. Mr. Lottman allegedly replied: "Well, the first thing 
you can do to save your job is to fill out a statement." Brf. App. at 9. Everyone else at the 
meeting flatly denies that any such statement was made. (R. 1385-86.) Yet even assuming 
it was made, the statement was by no means an offer to alter Mr. Francisconi's at-will 
employment status. Mr. Francisconi may have subjectively believed thai all he had to do was 
sign a confession and perhaps make some restitution and the whole matter would be 
forgiven. He may well have based this opinion on conversations he had had with other 
employees. See Brf. App. at 10. But even under his own version of the facts, the Railroad 
never actually promised he could keep his job in exchange for a statement. Rather, Mr. 
Lottman allegedly said that the "first thing" he could do to save his job was to fill out a 
statement - not that giving a statement would alone be sufficient.4 
Moreover, Mr. Francisconi knew that as far as the Railroad was concerned his at-will 
status could only be altered by a writing to that effect. Mr. Francisconi and the Railroad have 
never formally agreed in writing to any new conditions of his employment. Given the 
parties' prior agreement in this regard, and given the ambiguous statement by Mr. Lottman, 
4As a sign of contrition, providing the confession no doubt weighed in 
Mr. Francisconi's favor. However, the Railroad decided it was not enough in light of the 
circumstances. By providing the confession, Mr. Francisconi took a necessaiy step toward 
saving his job, but ultimately that step was not sufficient. 
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no reasonable jury could find a "clear manifestation of the [Railroad's] intent to alter 
[Mr. Francisconi's] at-will relationship... upon which [Francisconi] could reasonably rely." 
Sorenson, 873 P.2d at 1148. That is, Mr. Francisconi could not "reasonably rely" on a 
strained interpretation of an ambiguous oral statement which he knew was contrary to the 
Railroad's express policy.5 Such a statement is not "sufficiently definite to operate as a 
contract provision." Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1001-02 ("There must be a manifestation of the 
employer's intent that is communicated to the employee and sufficiently definite to operate 
as a contract provision. Furthermore, the manifestation of the employer's intent must be of 
such a nature that the employee can reasonably believe that the employer is making an offer 
of employment other than employment at will."). 
The alleged contract also lacks consideration. The Railroad gained nothing from the 
signed confession other than further documentation of what it already knew for a certainty 
— that Mr. Francisconi had flagrantly abused the "in lieu o f policy. The confession did not 
provide just cause for the Railroad to terminate him since, as an at-will employee, none was 
needed. For his part, Mr. Francisconi gave up nothing. The Railroad was already free to 
terminate him for any reason or no reason at all; he did not make himself more subject to 
termination by giving the confession. And Mr. Francisconi never returned to work, which 
is typically the consideration supplied by the employee in implied contract cases, including 
Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992), on which 
5This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that Mr. Francisconi has never put 
forth evidence that the Railroad employees in the Omaha meeting had authority to make or 
revoke offers of employment, or that he ever thought they did. 
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Mr. Francisconi relies. See also Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1044-45 
(Utah 1989) (Durham, J., joined by Steward, J.). Thus, Mr. Francisconi did not rely to his 
detriment. His statement was essentially a plea for mercy, not valid consideration for a 
binding contract.6 
The confession-for-job argument is also disingenuous in two respects. First, 
according to Mr. Francisconi, he did not provide a valid confession - he now claims that 
under pressure to save his job he essentially lied when he wrote the confession. Brf. App. 
at 9-10. Mr. Francisconi cannot be heard to argue that providing a false admission of 
wrongdoing - an admission he now takes back and denies - is a valid basis for a contract 
altering his at-will status; it certainly cannot be deemed valid consideration. 
Second, Mr. Francisconi adamantly maintains that not only is he innocent of abusing 
the "in lieu o f policy, but the real reason he was terminated was because Arthur Shoener 
wanted to get back at him for having an affair with Shoener's mistress. Brf. App. at 7,44-45. 
(In terminating Mr. Francisconi, "[the Railroad] was motivated by the malice of its number 
two official, Mr. Shoener, who seized upon the opportunity to punish Mr. Francisconi, a 
mere safety manger, for having a prior relationship with Ms. Tower."). If true, then it 
necessarily follows that the Railroad did not violate the alleged contract. Case law is clear 
that an employer can "promise not to fire [an] employee[] for a certain reason, thereby 
6Recognizing such a contract would also raise serious concerns under the Statute of 
Frauds. The alleged contract not to terminate Mr. Francisconi for past abuses of the "in lieu 
o f policy is an indefinite contract that "by its terms is not to be performed within one year 
from the making of the agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1). Under the Statute of 
Frauds, such a contract would have to be "in writing, signed by the party to be charged with 
the agreement," i.e., the Railroad, or else it is "void." Id. § 25-5-4. No such writing exists. 
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modifying the employee's at-will status," but it is also clear that the employer "retaine[s] his 
at-will prerogative to fire [the employee] at any time for any other reason." Sanderson, 844 
P.2d at 307 (emphasis in original). Mr. Francisconi's insistence that he was terminated 
because of Mr. Shoener's personal spite precludes the claim that he was terminated for 
violating the "in lieu o f policy after being promised he would not be. 
This case is very different from Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co,, 844 P.2d 
303, where an employer promised not to fire an employee for using its sick-leave policy but 
allegedly did so anyway. The alleged promise in Sanderson was express and unequivocal, 
not (as here) ambiguous. The offer was accepted by the employee's return to work, which 
supplied the necessary consideration. Here, consideration is totally lacking. The plaintiff 
in Sanderson claimed he was fired based on the very reason for which the employer 
promised not to terminate him, whereas Mr. Francisconi maintains he was actually fired for 
an entirely different reason. And Sanderson did not involve the firm understanding by both 
parties that the employee's at-will status could only be changed by an authorized writing to 
that effect. Mr. Francisconi's reliance on Sanderson is entirely misplaced. 
* * # * 
The trial court properly dismissed Mr. Francisconi's first cause of action for breach 
of contract. Mr. Francisconi failed to meet his burden of proving the existence of an implied 
contract altering his at-will employment status, or that such a contract was breached. 
III. The District Court Properly Dismissed Mr. Francisconi's Claim for Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress. 
The district court correctly dismissed Mr. Francisconi's claim for intentional infliction 
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of emotional distress. Mr. Francisconi failed to establish a prima facie claim that the 
Railroad intentionally engaged in atrocious and outrageous conduct in order to cause him 
severe emotional distress. 
"An action for intentional infliction of emotional distress protects the emotional well-
being and security of the individual against intentional and outrageous acts designed to 
produce distress." Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992). 
To prove a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Mr. Francisconi must show: 
(a) that the defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the 
plaintiff considered outrageous and intolerable in that it offends the 
generally accepted standards of decency and morality, 
(b) with the puipose of inflicting emotional distress or where any 
reasonable person would have known that such would result, and 
(c) that severe emotional distress resulted as a direct result of the 
defendant's conduct. 
Id. 
Therefore, claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the employment 
context survive summary judgment only in clearly "outrageous and intolerable" situations. 
Under Utah law, "the plaintiff bears a heavy burden to prove intentional infliction of 
emotional distress." Maxfieldv. North American Phillips Consumer Electronics Corp., 724 
F.Supp. 840, 844 (D.Utah 1989). Offensive or immoral conduct is often found to be 
insufficient. See Newsome v. McKesson Corp., 932 F.Supp. 1339, 1343 (D.Utah 1996) 
(listing "Utah cases which have held seemingly outrageous conduct not to be actionable"). 
While not adopting its precise language, the Utah Supreme Court has "in no way softened 
the Restatement's requirement" that the plaintiff prove "extraordinarily vile conduct, conduct 
that is 'atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.'" Retherford v. AT&T 
-29-
Communications, 884 P.2d 949, 977 n.19 (Utah 1992) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 46, cmt. d (1965)). 
Thus, in Robertson v. Utah Fuel Company, 889 P.2d 1382 (Utah App. 1995), this 
Court found that the plaintiff could not "establish a prima facie claim of emotional distress" 
even though the defendant-employer had forced him to confess his drug use to other 
employees and then terminated him; the Court deemed such conduct insufficiently 
outrageous or intolerable. Id. at 1388-89.7 
The district court ruled that as a matter of law Mr. Francisconi had failed to put forth 
any evidence suggesting that the Railroad engaged in the sort of "extraordinarily vile" or 
"atrocious" conduct necessary to support an intentional infliction claim. That ruling was 
undoubtedly correct. The process of confronting and ultimately terminating an employee, 
especially for dishonesty, is always unpleasant and at times fraught with heated emotions and 
strong words. See Wornickv. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732,736 (Tex. 1993) ("Termination of an 
employee is never pleasant, especially for the employee."). That Mr. Francisconi felt deeply 
uncomfortable during the process of being terminated for dishonesty is natural. But much 
more is necessary for a viable intentional infliction claim. Larson v. Sysco Corporation, 767 
P.2d 557, 561 (Utah 1989) ("Unless some outrageous conduct ... has attended the 
1
 Accord Sperber v. GaligherAsh Co., 747 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1987) (lying about reason 
for dismissal insufficiently outrageous); Newsome, 932 F.Supp. 1339 (discrimination against 
female employees, including the plaintiff, who were unwilling to provide sexual favors, 
calling the plaintiff "old bitch," orchestrating rumors against the plaintiff, and alleged 
termination on the basis of sex, not sufficiently outrageous under Utah law); Jenks v. 
Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co., 53 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1708, 1720-22, 1989 WL 
226145 (D.Utah 1989) (racial slurs and jokes, refusal to train, and termination of 
employment insufficient under Utah law). 
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termination, [the plaintiff] cannot maintain [an] action" for infliction of emotional distress.") 
Mr. Francisconi never put forth any evidence establishing that the Railroad's actions 
were "extraordinarily vile" or "atrocious." None of the events during and immediately after 
the April 26, 1996 meeting remotely qualify. Mr. Francisconi alleges that during the 
April 26 meeting he was accused of being a liar and a thief, threatened with criminal 
prosecution for his abuse of the "in lieu o f policy, questioned for four hours without 
representation or a chance to refute the allegations, forced to sign a confession to save his 
job, and pressured to resign. See Brf. App. at 42-43.8 After the meeting, where he had been 
removed from service pending further review, Mr. Francisconi allegedly was not allowed to 
return alone to company headquarters. Upon returning to Salt Lake City, Railroad security 
met him at the airport, instructed him to relinquish his Railroad car and the keys to his 
Railroad office (requiring him to catch a ride home with a friend), and told him law 
enforcement would be contacting him. See id. at 43. Though unpleasant to be sure, such 
conduct cannot possibly be termed "extraordinarily vile" or "atrocious." Far more is required 
for an intentional infliction claim than being called a liar, denied use of the company car, and 
so on. 
The same is true of the Railroad's alleged efforts to get Mr. Francisconi to sign the 
separation agreement. According to the summary in Mr. Francisconi's opening brief, the 
Railroad attempted to force him to sign the agreement by: (1) calling him at least three times 
8In his opening brief, Mr. Francisconi embellishes his own allegations. He claims that 
Railroad employees at the April 26 meeting "demanded that he resign or face criminal 
prosecution." However, the record citation does not support any such threat. (Cf.R. 1384-
85.) 
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at home during the three weeks following the April 26 meeting; (2) telling him the Railroad 
would not offer him COBRA medical coverage unless he signed while knowing his wife was 
scheduled to undergo surgery in June 1996; (3) telling him he would be criminally 
prosecuted for theft unless he signed; (4) telling him he would not receive payment for 
accrued vacation or salary for the month of May (which he had not worked) unless he signed; 
and (5) telling him that unless he signed the Railroad would give a negative report to a« 
prospective employer. When Mr. Francisconi refused to sign, the Railroad's benefits 
department was allegedly instructed not to offer COBRA coverage. See Brf. App. at 44. 
An important clarification is needed. Mr. Francisconi gives the impression that the 
Railroad never offered him COBRA medical coverage and that his wife suffered as a result. 
Any such suggestion is false. The Railroad did indeed contemplate denying COBRA 
coverage, but that was perfectly appropriate. It is well established that an employer is not 
required to offer COBRA coverage where an employee has been terminated for "gross 
misconduct." See Collins v. Aggreko, Inc., 884 F.Supp. 450,452-453 (D.Utah 1995). "Gross 
misconduct" has been held to include "misappropriation of company funds." Id. Because 
Mr. Francisconi's flagrant misuse of the expense policy constituted "gross misconduct," the 
Railroad had a legal right not to offer COBRA coverage. 
However, it is undisputed that the Railroad in fact offered COBRA coverage and that, 
after some temporary confusion with the hospital was cleared up, Mrs. Francisconi obtained 
the surgeries she needed. By letter dated June 7,1996, the Railroad offered Mr. Francisconi 
the option of electing COBRA coverage. (R. 1028, 1135.) On June 21, 1996, Mrs. 
Francisconi elected COBRA coverage, while Mr. Francisconi declined. (R. 1028.) After her 
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insurance status was confirmed by the hospital, Mrs. Francisconi had her surgery, paid for 
under the Railroad's COBRA coverage. (R. 1220.) 
Nothing in regard to the Railroad's handling of the COBRA issue could reasonably 
be deemed "extraordinarily vile" or "atrocious." The only troubling allegations relate to the 
alleged threat to deny COBRA coverage. But as explained, the Railroad was well within its 
rights to do so - COBRA coverage need not be offered in the case of termination for "gross 
misconduct." Collins, 884 F.Supp. at 452-453. That the Railroad allegedly9 threatened to 
do what it had a legal right to do does not give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. This principle is well established.10 
Finally, the allegations relating to the Railroad's supposedly real motivation behind 
9The Court should be aware that the Railroad denies making any malicious threats. 
The deposition testimony indicates that Railroad employees were quite concerned about Mrs. 
Francisconi's health. {See, e.g., R. 59.) Regardless, even the alleged conduct is insufficient 
to satisfy Mr. Francisconi's heavy burden. 
]0See, e.g., Brandes v. Rice Trust, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 144, 150 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) 
("There is no liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress where an actor does no 
more than insist on its legal rights."); Womick, 856 S.W.2dat735 (employer "was exercising 
its legal rights, which legally cannot constitute outrageous conduct."); 38 Am. Jur. 2d Fright, 
Shock, and Mental Disturbance § 12 (1999) ("There is no liability for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress where an actor was exercising his or her legal rights."); 74 Am. Jur. 2d 
Torts § 18 (1974) ("Therefore, it is a general rule of the common law that a cause of action 
arises whenever one person, by an act not in the exercise of a lawful right, causes loss or 
does damage to another with an intent... to produce such harm, without just or lawful excuse 
or justifiable cause or occasion.") (emphasis added and internal footnotes omitted); see also 
Fleming v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 604 A.2d657, 686 (NJ. Super. Ct. LawDiv. 1992) 
(employee contended that a manager told him that if he resigned his employment he would 
not be prosecuted; employee refused and was prosecuted; court rejected claim for infliction 
of emotional distress: "Where, as here, probable cause existed to prosecute [an employee], 
he cannot show the kind of outrageous conduct on the part of defendant necessary to 
maintain his action."); cf Franklin Nursing Home v. Local 144, 503 N.Y.S.2d 908, 909 
(App. Div. 1986) ("[A] threat to do that which one has a legal right to do cannot be deemed 
coercion."). 
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the termination are likewise insufficient. Mr. Francisconi continues to maintain the baseless 
canard that he was fired in an act of male territoriality. Supposedly, the Railroad was 
"motivated by the malice of its number two official, Mr. Shoener, who seized upon the 
opportunity to punish Mr. Francisconi ... for having a prior relationship with [Barbara] 
Tower," a former employee and Mr. Shoener's alleged "mistress." Brf. App. at 44-45. 
There is literally no evidence supporting this theory. The allegations are based on the most 
tenuous of inferences which no reasonable jury could ever accept as true. But even assuming -
their truth, the alleged conduct does not remotely rise to the level of "extraordinarily vile" 
or "atrocious." Terminating an at-will employee for having an affair is not illegal. There is .-
no public policy reason for protecting an employee in these circumstances, especially in a 
State where extramarital affairs are still technically crimes. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-103 
("Adultery"); id. § 76-7-104 ("Fornication"). 
In sum, Mr. Francisconi failed to set forth any facts which, singly or together, could 
satisfy his "heavy burden" of proving a claim for "intentional infliction of emotional 
distress." See Maxfield, 724 F.Supp. at 844. 
IV, Mr. Francisconi's Claim for Defamation Was Properly Dismissed, 
Mr. Francisconi's defamation claim is without merit. He alleges the Railroad defamed 
him in two instances: (1) at the April 26 meeting when, in the process of confronting him 
with his abuse of the "in lieu o f policy, one or more of the investigators called him a "liar 
and a thief," and (2) in a conversation between a current Railroad employee and a former 
employee about why he was fired. The district court properly rejected these allegations as 
a valid basis for a defamation claim. 
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Under Utah law, "[t]o state a claim for defamation, [the plaintiff] must show that 
defendant^ published the [alleged defamatory] statements concerning him, that the 
statements were false, defamatory, and not subject to any privilege, that the statements were 
published with the requisite degree of fault, and that their publication resulted in damage." 
West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah App. 1994); see also Seegmiller v. KSL, 
Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 974, 976 (Utah 1981); Utah Code Ann. §§ 45-2-2 to -7. 
Two aspects of this tort deserve special note. First, to be actionable, publication of 
the alleged defamatory statement must not be privileged: 
The publication of a defamatory statement is conditionally or qualifiedly 
privileged in certain situations in which a defendant seeks to vindicate or 
further an interest 'regarded as being sufficiently important to justify some 
latitude for making mistakes.' Whether a publication is conditionally 
privileged is a question of law to be determined by the trial court, unless a 
genuine factual issue exists regarding whether the scope of the qualified 
privilege has been transcended or the defendant acted with malice. 
Dubois v. Grand Central, 872 P.2 1073 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Brehany v. 
Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49,58 (Utah 1991) (quoting W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton 
on the Law of Torts § 115, at 825 (5th ed. 1984))). "This qualified privilege protects an 
employer's communication to employees and to other interested parties concerning the 
reasons for an employee's discharge." Brehany, 812 P.2d at 58. Second, a defamatory 
statement must be false to be actionable: "truth is an absolute defense to a defamation 
claim." Jenkins v. Weis, 868 P.d 1374, 1376 (Utah App. 1994); Brehany, 812 P.2d at 57. 
There is absolutely no evidence the Railroad made any non-privileged communication 
to any individual that could reasonably be construed as defaming Mr. Francisconi. The 
alleged statement made during the April 26 meeting that Mr. Francisconi was a liar and a 
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thief was nothing more than the Railroad confronting an employee on a legitimate matter of 
concern to the company - abuse of the "in lieu o f policy. Such communications are clearly 
privileged. Moreover, an essential element of defamation is "publication to a third party." 
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558. Here, the communication was made by the 
Railroad's agents directly to the plaintiff. Furthermore, the statement was true: 
Mr. Francisconi was in fact abusing the policy, as he admitted in a signed statement. Truth 
is an absolute defense to defamation. See Jenkins, 868 P.2d at 1376.11 
Mr. Francisconi also argues that a conversation between one current employee and 
one former employee about why he was fired renders the Railroad liable for defamation. See 
Brf. App. at 46-47. That is obviously wrong. Company scuttlebutt and gossip cannot give 
rise to a claim for defamation against an employer unless somehow those making the 
statements were acting within the course and scope of their employment. See Birkner v. Salt 
Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989) (employer liable for the torts of its employees only 
if the employee's purpose in performing the acts was to further the employer's business). 
"Thus, there is no vicarious liability for an employer when an employee acts entirely on 
personal motives unrelated to the employer's interests." Hodges v. Gibson Products Co. ,811 
P.2d 151, 156-57 (Utah 1991). There is no evidence that the alleged defamatory statement 
from Tom Haig (an employee) to Barbara Tower (a former employee) had anything to do 
nMr. Francisconi argues that whether the alleged statement was made with malice is 
a question for the jury. Brf. App. at 46-47. But one never gets to that question if the 
statement is true or if it was not published to a third party. Further, there is no evidence of 
malice. Mr. Francisconi's suggestion that Mr. Shoener terminated him for personal reasons 
is baseless and, in any event, cannot be connected to the alleged defamatory statements. 
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with company business. Nor is there any evidence that such scuttlebutt, which did not 
reference criminal activity, actually resulted in damage to Mr. Francisconi. Moreover, the 
statement was true and thus absolutely privileged. 
Raising an argument for the first time on appeal, Mr. Francisconi contends that the 
Railroad "excessively published the defamatory statement to Mr. Haig," "an employee of 
[the Railroad] with no known connection to the audit." Brf. App. at 47-48. Such publication 
allegedly vitiates the privilege. Id. This argument was never raised below and therefore 
should not be considered. See State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70, f 8, 9 P.3d 164. Regardless, 
it is without merit. There is absolutely no evidence in the record of how Mr. Haig learned 
about Mr. Francisconi's termination. The record indicates that Mr. Francisconi spoke with 
a number of people before the April 26 meeting and he likely spoke with the colleague who 
gave him a ride home from the aiiport about what had happened. He may well have told 
others about why he had been terminated. The point is that it cannot merely be assumed that 
someone acting on behalf of the Railroad told Mr. Haig. There must be at least some 
evidence. Mr. Francisconi has put forth none.12 Moreover, the statement was true and thus 
absolutely privileged. Summary judgment on Mr. Francisconi's defamation claim was 
entirely proper. 
12Even assuming arguendo the Railroad did publish it to its employees, that does not 
make the publication excessive. Ensuring that employees understand the severe 
consequences that will attend dishonest practices is a legitimate business concern. Telling 
employees about what Mr. Francisconi did and the result is not an excessive publication. 
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V. The District Court Properly Dismissed Mr, Francisconi's Claim for Fraud. 
Mr. Francisconi alleges Mr. Lottman told him that the "'first thing he [could] do to 
save [his] job is to fill out a statement'" confessing the wrong. Brf. App. at 9. 
Mr. Francisconi provided the statement, but that was not sufficient to save his job. He claims 
this constitutes fraud. 
The Utah Supreme Court has outlined the elements of a cause of action for fraud: 
Under Utah law, to bring a claim sounding in fraud, a party must allege 
(1) that a representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing material 
fact (3) which was false and (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be 
false or (b) made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge 
upon which to base such a representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the 
other party to act upon it and (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby induced 
to act (9) to that party's injury and damage. 
Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066-67 (Utah 1996). 
The plaintiff bears a significantly higher burden of proof in actions for fraud. 
"[F]raud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence." Horrocks v. Westfalia Stemat, 
892 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah App. 1995). This higher standard of proof results in an elevated 
burden on summary judgment as well.13 
13In interpreting Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that "in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must 
view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden." 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 254 (1986). Accordingly, the High Court 
held that "the clear-and-convincing standard of proof should be taken into account in ruling 
on summary judgment motions." Id. at 255. This Court in Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 
871 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994), expressly adopted the Supreme Court's approach: "In 
granting a motion for summary judgment, a trial judge must consider each element of the 
claim under the appropriate standard of proof. . . . Fraud must be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence." Id. at 1046 (citing Anderson); see also Robinson v. Intermountain 
Health Care, 740 P.2d 262, 266 (Utah App. 1987) ("In evaluating whether the evidence 
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This Court has held that a plaintiffs mere assertions are not sufficient to meet the 
burden of the clear and convincing evidence test on summary judgment: 
[The plaintiffs] assertions, without more, are inadequate to establish 
by clear and convincing evidence that [opposing party] did not intend to 
perform the alleged promise at the time it was made or that the alleged 
misrepresentations were made for the purpose of deceiving [the plaintiff] 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of [the plaintiffs] 
fraud claim because [he] has failed to demonstrate clear and convincing 
evidence that could support a verdict for him at trial. 
Andalex Resources, Inc., 871 P.2d at 1047. 
Mr. Francisconi's fraud claim cannot survive summary judgment. First, there is no 
clear and convincing evidence that the Railroad ever made the alleged misrepresentation. 
All the Railroad employees present at the April 26 meeting deny that anyone promised 
Mr. Francisconi continued employment in exchange for a signed confession. {See R. 1385-
86.) Even Mr. Francisconi's own self-serving assertions don't go that far. He alleges that 
during the April 26 meeting Mr. Lottman stated that "the first thing you can do to save your 
job is to fill out a statement." Brf. App. at 9; R. 1228 (emphasis added). That is hardly 
"clear and convincing" evidence of a promise of future employment, but rather a statement 
that if Mr. Francisconi were to have any chance of keeping his job the "first thing" he had 
to do was acknowledge his wrongdoing.14 Indeed, Mr. Francisconi ended his handwritten 
reveals a genuine issue of material fact about the most likely cause of [plaintiff s injury], we 
must take into consideration the eventual standard of proof, at trial on the merits, on each 
element of [plaintiff s] negligence claims."). 
l4See Model Utah Jury Instructions — Civil, 2.19 ("For evidence to be clear and 
convincing, it must at least have reached the point where there remains no substantial doubt 
as to the truth or correctness of the conclusion based upon the evidence."); see also Jardine 
v. Archibald, 279 P.2d 454 (Utah 1955); Kirchgestner v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. 
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statement with an express plea that he be allowed to keep his job, suggesting the Railroad 
had yet to make a binding promise in that regard. (R. 1116.) In short, Mr. Francisconi's bald 
assertion is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment on the fraud claim. 
Second, not all misrepresentations can form the basis of an action for fraud — only 
a misrepresentation of a "presently existing material fact" will suffice. The promised 
performance or nonperformance of a future act does not qualify as a representation of a 
presently existing material fact: 
It has been said that the proper test to determine whether a 
representation is of an existing fact [and thus is capable of giving rise to a 
fraud claim] or of a futurity [which is not] is that where the fulfilment or 
satisfaction of the thing represented depends on a promised performance of a 
future act ... then the representation is not of an existing fact; but that a 
statement is of an existing fact if a quality is asserted which inheres in the 
article so that at the time the presentation is made the quality may be said to 
exist independently of future acts or performance of the one making the 
representation, independently of other particular occurrences in the future, and 
independently of particular future uses or requirements of the buyer. 
37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 57, p. 88 (1968) (emphasis added). 
Here the supposed misrepresentation - that Mr. Francisconi would not be fired if he 
signed a confession - did not concern a presently existing material fact. The alleged promise 
of continued employment was "a promised performance of a future act" which is not 
actionable as fraud. Id. 
On appeal, Mr. Francisconi engages in verbal gymnastics to force the Railroad's 
alleged promise not to terminate him into a statement concerning a "presently existing 
material fact." Curiously, Mr. Francisconi goes so far as to state that "[h]e did not request 
Co., 233 P.2d 699, 700 (Utah 1951); Greener v. Greener, 212 P.2d 194 (Utah 1949). 
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an assurance of future employment...." Brf. App. at 49. If so, then his breach of contract 
claim is totally baseless since it is predicated on an alleged promise that his employment 
would not be terminated in the future for past violations of the "in lieu o f policy, or that in 
the near future he could participate in full UPGRADE proceedings. Naturally, a promise not 
to terminate someone is a promise to refrain from committing a future act, whether in the 
next few minutes or the distant future. 
Third, the undisputed facts demonstrate there was no detrimental reliance by 
Mr. Francisconi. "To make fraud actionable, there must be some damage to the plaintiff for 
which he seeks recovery." Tretheway v. Miracle Mortgage, Inc., 2000 UT 12, \ 8,995 P.2d 
599. It is well established that "there is no damage where the position of the complaining 
party is not worse than it would be had the alleged fraud not been committed." 37 Am. Jur. 
2d, supra, § 292. Mr. Francisconi has never attempted to put forth specific evidence 
establishing how he relied to his detriment on the alleged misrepresentation. Both on appeal 
and below he merely asserts that a reasonable jury could find detrimental reliance. See Brf. 
App. at 49. Not true. Mr. Francisconi's misconduct was well-documented - there is no 
question he spliced receipts and so on. As an at-will employee, the Railroad had every right 
to terminate Mr. Francisconi whether or not he signed the statement. Thus, Mr. Francisconi 
gave up absolutely nothing when he signed the confession. Rather, he gained the chance -
unavailing though it was - of keeping his job. Even if he relied on an undeserved promise 
of leniency, his reliance left him no worse off than before. Hence, the alleged reliance was 
not detrimental. 
The district court correctly dismissed Mr. Francisconi's fraud claim. Mr. Francisconi 
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has not met his burden of proving the elements of this claim by evidence which a reasonable 
jury could find clear and convincing. 
VI. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Allowing the Railroad to File 
an Amended Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Railroad filed a timely Motion for Summary Judgment with a memorandum in 
support, accompanied by an ex-parte application to file an over-length memorandum. See 
Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501(l)(a). The district court denied the application 
and accordingly rejected the Railroad's over-length memorandum. (R. 979.) Thereafter the 
Railroad filed its Amended Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
which fully complied with applicable page limits. Mr. Francisconi then filed a motion to 
strike the amended memorandum on the ground that it had been filed after the scheduling 
order's cut-off date for filing dispositive motions. The district court denied the motion. 
Mr. Francisconi contends that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to 
strike the amended memorandum for violating the scheduling order.15 The argument is 
15In the body of his argument, Mr. Francisconi contends that the district court "abused 
its discretion" by denying his motion to strike. Brf. App. at 25. However, in his "Issues 
Presented for Review" he states that the appellate court reviews this issue under a "correction 
of eiTor standard." Id. at 1. Nevertheless, there is no question that the district court has 
broad discretion in handling scheduling matters. As this Court recently stated, "[b]ecause 
the trial judge deals directly with the parties and the discovery process, he or she has great 
latitude in determining the most efficient and fair manner to conduct the court's business. 
As a result, trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether a violation of a 
scheduling order warrants sanction." A. K. & i?. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen 
Construction, 1999 UT App 87, ^  36,977 P.2d 518 (citations omitted and emphasis added). 
Mr. Francisconi also argues that the district court's ruling on the motion to strike is 
not entitled to any presumption of correctness because the court failed to state reasons for its 
ruling. Brf App. at 25 (citing Ron Shepherd Insur., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 654 n.7 
(Utah 1994)). He is simply mistaken. The rule Mr. Francisconi seeks to invoke is based on 
the requirements of Rule 52(a), which applies only to "motions granted under Rules 12(b), 
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baseless, and quite ironic.16 "The puipose behind a scheduling order is to allow the parties 
to properly prepare for trial and to save the parties from unnecessary expenses." A.K. & R. 
Whipple Plumbing and Heating, 1999 UT App at ^  36. Mr. Francisconi does not argue that 
the district court's denial of his motion to strike caused him any prejudice. In its discretion, 
the trial court rejected the timely but over-length memorandum in support of summary 
judgment but - again in its discretion - allowed the Railroad to file a conforming 
memorandum beyond the dispositive motion cut-off. This was not an abuse of discretion in 
any sense. 
VII. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Rejecting Mr, Francisconi's 
Evidentiary Objections. 
In an obvious effort to prevent the judge from addressing the merits of his claims, 
Mr. Francisconi raised numerous technical objections to the various exhibits the Railroad 
submitted on summary judgment, notwithstanding that the facts established by the exhibits 
were largely undisputed. The trial court's denial of Mr. Francisconi's motion to strike was 
50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground" - not to the 
denial of a mere motion to strike based on a scheduling issue. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); see 
also Retherford v. AT&T Communications of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 958 
n.4 (Utah 1992) (discussing rule). 
16On December 20, 2000 - the deadline for Mr. Francisconi to submit his principal 
brief to this Court - Mr. Francisconi attempted to file an over-length brief, accompanied by 
a motion for leave to file an over-length principal brief. On December 22,2000, this Court 
denied the motion without explanation and rejected the brief but granted him additional time 
to file a conforming brief. Under Mr. Francisconi's argument, this Court should not have 
granted the additional time. Obviously, such a harsh approach would not serve the interests 
of justice, whether here or in the trial court. 
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by no stretch an abuse of its "broad grant of discretion."17 
Mr. Francisconi's Application for Employment. Mr. Francisconi contends that his 
Application for Employment (see R. 1042-49) was never authenticated. That is not accurate. 
The authenticity of the entire Application was established by the Affidavit of Michael 
Bernard, a Railroad auditor. (R. 1471.) Attached to Mr. Bernard's affidavit was a copy of -
the Application. (R. 1477-83.) Through his affidavit, and based on his "personal 
knowledge," Mr. Bernard identifies the Application (including the portion entitled Terms and ** 
Conditions of Employment) and attests that it is "part of the company's official records" and*; 
that it had been "maintained in the normal course of business within Mr. Francisconi's * 
personnel file." (R. 1470-71.) 
Mr. Francisconi himself authenticated the Terms and Conditions of Employment, the 
only portion of the Application for Employment actually relied on by the Railroad. At 
deposition, Mr. Francisconi was shown a copy of the Terms and Conditions of Employment 
and the following exchange took place: 
Q. (By Mr. Waddoups) . . . Let's see Mr. Francisconi, I show you now 
what's been marked as Deposition Exhibit No. 2. It appears to be a 
17
"In civil cases such as the present one, where the evidence sought to be introduced 
does not raise concerns of the type that have produced heightened standards of sensitivity 
[e.g., "evidence that might violate the Fourth Amendment"], a trial court decision to admit 
evidence is reviewed under a broad grant of discretion." Murdoch v. Springville Municipal 
Corporation, 1999 UT 39, f 25, 982 P.2d 65 (reviewing trial court decision to strike 
affidavits) (emphasis added); Klinger v. Rightly, 889 P.2d 1372,1376 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
("We defer to the trial couifs decision about whether a proper foundation for evidence 
admission is laid.... The ruling of the trial court in this regard will not be overturned unless 
there is a showing of an abuse of discretion.") (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). As demonstrated in footnote 15, supra, Mr. Francisconi's assertion that the trial 
court's ruling has no presumption of correctness is mistaken. 
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description of the terms and conditions of employment with Union 
Pacific Railroad, and if you'll look at that exhibit please including the 
last page. Is that your signature? 
A. That is my signature, yes.[18] 
(R. 1486.) 
Taken together, these facts establish that the Application "is what the [Railroad] 
claims it to be." State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898,900-01 (Utah App. 1996). Mr. Francisconi 
has never argued that the document is a fabrication or otherwise not authentic, much less that 
Mr. Bernard was lying. The district court did not abuse its broad discretion in refusing to 
strike the Application for lack of authentication. 
Mr. Francisconi also argues that the Application for Employment is hearsay. Brf. 
App. at 27. However, the document was maintained in the ordinary course of business in 
Mr. Francisconi's personnel file, making it an exception to the hearsay rule. See Utah R. 
Evid. 803(6) (business records exception). Moreover, as a statement adopted by 
Mr. Francisconi by virtue of his signature, the Terms and Conditions of Employment is an 
admission of a party-opponent, falling outside the hearsay rule. See id., Rule 801(d)(2). The 
district court's refusal to strike the Application as hearsay did not constitute an abuse of its 
18During the deposition, counsel for Mr. Francisconi objected to the Terms and 
Conditions of Employment on the basis that it appeared to be part of a larger document. The 
Railroad submitted the entire Application for Employment in support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment to overcome any such objection. Mr. Francisconi's statement on appeal 
that the "document that was attached to [the Railroad's] motion for summary judgment was 
not the same three-page document [i.e., the Terms and Conditions of Employment] offered 
at Mr. Francisconi's deposition" (Brf. App. at 26-27) is somewhat disingenuous, inasmuch 
as the Terms and Conditions of Employment were the only portion used to support the 
motion. At any rate, Mr. Bernard's affidavit is sufficient to authenticate the entire document. 
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broad discretion. 
Affidavit of John Ivester. Mr. Francisconi's attack on the affidavit of John Ivester is 
a red herring. Mr. Francisconi has never denied that he intentionally cut and spliced 
reimbursement receipts in a way that eliminated evidence of exactly what was purchased. 
(R. 1382, Tf 4.) His own affidavit candidly admits as much. (R. 1214,^6.) Indeed, he claims 
he believed such a procedure was appropriate because "he thought the specific items gifted -
were 'personal between me and whoever I was giving that in-lieu-of expense to.5" (R. 1225.)A 
He merely objects to the characterization that in doing so he was attempting to "conceal the. 
nature of the purchased merchandise." What other reasonable inference could possibly be 
drawn he does not say. Nor does he deny making any of the purchases listed on the "In Lieu 
of Lodging Schedule" or otherwise claim any inaccuracy. The issue whether Mr. Francisconi 
abused the "in lieu o f policy has never turned on what he purchased - that is largely 
undisputed - but rather on whether such purchases were authorized. His objection to the 
Ivester affidavit is essentially a pointless dispute over technicalities that do not alter the 
undisputed material facts. 
Be that as it may, Mr. Francisconi's evidentiary quibbles are misplaced. The 
documents Mr. Ivester examined during his audit of Mr. Francisconi's expenses - e.g., the 
Railroad's corporate American Express statements and Mr. Francisconi's own Personal 
Expense Reports and the receipts in his file - were all kept in the ordinary course of business 
and thus fall under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. See Utah R. Evid. 
803(6). Mr. Francisconi's own expense reports are also admissions under Rule 801(d)(2). 
And contrary to Mr. Francisconi's representations on appeal, Mr. Ivester's affidavit does not 
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mention "unnamed 'store personnel'" or "unidentified 'information to the auditor.'" Brf. 
App. at 29; cf. R. 1058-60 (Ivester affidavit). 
The In Lieu of Lodging Schedule attached to the Ivester affidavit contains the findings 
of Mr. Ivester's independent audit and analysis of Mr. Francisconi's Personal Expense 
Reports. {See R. 1063-64.) This audit was conducted in the ordinary course of business. 
The Schedule represents a data compilation and professional analysis of business records 
maintained in the normal course of business. It is therefore a business record under Rule 
803(6). Moreover, the accuracy of the Schedule itself has never been challenged, despite the 
fact that the supporting documentation was produced to Mr. Francisconi. Under these facts, 
the document should also be admissible under Rule 803(24) as having sufficient 
"circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." The district court did not abuse its broad 
discretion in refusing to strike the Ivester Affidavit. 
The Interview Summary Prepared by Janice Arthur. Mr. Francisconi's hearsay 
objection in this regard is without merit. As Senior Auditor, Janice Arthur attended the 
April 26, 1996 meeting at which Mr. Francisconi was confronted with his abuse of the "in 
lieu o f policy. Ms. Arthur took detailed notes of the interview. From those notes and her 
own memory, she prepared a written summary of Mr. Francisconi's statements at the 
meeting. (R. 1489,1492-1500.) This Interview Summary was created within approximately 
one hour of the end of the interview. (R. 1489.) After preparing the Interview Summary, 
Ms. Arthur compared her summary with the notes of the interview taken by Mike Bernard 
and Jim Hale, who were also at the meeting, but made no changes. Id. In her affidavit 
submitted to the trial court, to which the Interview Summary was attached as an exhibit, Ms. 
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Arthur attested that the Interview Summary accurately reflects statements made by 
Mr. Francisconi during the interview. Id, 
Thus, the Interview Summary is unquestionably admissible as an admission by 
Mr. Francisconi. Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Mr. Francisconi made certain admissions at the 
April 26 meeting. Ms. Arthur restates those admissions in an affidavit which adopts and 
incorporates her meticulous summary - prepared within an hour of the meeting - of what 
Mr. Francisconi said. The summary is based on her personal knowledge, not the statements 
of third parties as Mr. Francisconi argues: in her affidavit, she affirms that to her "personal,, 
knowledge" the summary "accurately reflects statements made by Mr. Francisconi during 
the interview." R. 1488-89. It is difficult to imagine a more paradigmatic example of an 
admission by a party-opponent. Since the summary was created so soon after hearing what 
happened at the meeting, it also qualifies as a present sense impression. Utah R. Evid. 
803(1). 
And once again, it is significant to note that Mr. Francisconi does not dispute the 
substance of the evidence - he does not specifically deny any of the admissions contained 
within the Interview Summary. The district court did not abuse its broad discretion in 
refusing to strike the Interview Summary. 
The Executive Summary Prepared by Michael Bernard. Mr. Francisconi's hearsay 
objection to the Executive Summary of the findings of the Corporate Audit Staff is 
superfluous. The single sentence in the Statement of Facts relying on the summary simply 
stated: "The Corporate Audit Staff prepared a summary of its findings." (R. 1028, ^  32.) 
The material facts of this case are supported by other competent evidence. 
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That said, the document is admissible. Mr. Francisconi appears to be under the 
mistaken impression that audits and reports made and kept in the regular course of business 
cannot be evidence. The Rules of Evidence state otherwise. See Rule 803(6) (rejecting 
hearsay objections to "[a] memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of 
acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from 
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge" under certain conditions). The district 
court did not abuse its broad discretion in refusing to strike the Executive Summary. In any 
event, the objection has no substantive effect on the propriety of the motion. 
Larry Reif Letters Relating to COBRA Coverage. These documents were 
authenticated by Richard Messner at deposition. (R. 1466.) Moreover, both letters were 
maintained in the company's COBRA offer and elections files in the normal course of 
business and thus constitute business records. Id. But yet again, the objection is 
disingenuous. Mr. Francisconi himself in the First Amended Complaint states that the 
Railroad sent him notice of COBRA coverage on June 7, 1996, a fact confirmed by Mr. 
Messner at deposition. (R. 28,1135.) Mr. Francisconi admits that both he and his wife were 
offered - and his wife elected and received - COBRA continuation coverage. See Brf. App. 
at 13. There is no genuine issue of fact in this regard. 
UPGRADE Application Letters. Finally, Mr. Francisconi argues that two letters 
stating that the UPGRADE policy applies only to union employees should have been 
stricken. Brf. App. at 31-32. Both of these letters are maintained in the company's files and 
constitute business records maintained in the normal course of business. (R. 1466.) But 
regardless, it is undisputed that as a matter of longstanding practice the UPGRADE policy 
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applies only to union employees and has never been applied to management employees. 
(R. 1029,1383.) Once again, Mr. Francisconi is quibbling over issues that cannot reasonably 
be disputed and that do not alter the correctness of the trial court's ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court correctly granted the Railroad's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Railroad respectfully requests that the decision below be 
affirmed. 
DATED this S^ day of April, 2001. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Jon^. Waddoups 
Alexander Dushku 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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